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THE TWENTIETH AMENDMENT, THE
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947, AND
PRE-INAUGURAL PROBLEMS
Brian C. Kalt*
I’m going to say a little bit about how the 1947 Succession Act1 interacts
with the Twentieth Amendment with regard to succession issues that might
arise before inauguration.2 The Twentieth Amendment was conceived in the
1920s, mainly to shorten the lame-duck period between Election Day in
November and the start of the new congressional and presidential terms.3
While Congress was rewiring the transition period, it also did something
remarkably proactive. Congress reached out, particularly the House, to
identify and fix some related problems with the transition, even though they
were purely hypothetical.4 One of those hypothetical problems was a dead
president-elect. So Section 1 of the Twentieth Amendment declared
definitively that if the president-elect dies, then the vice president elect
swears in as president on January 20.5
They also recognized that the president-elect and vice president elect
might both die before being inaugurated or that the election might not have
been resolved for either of them by Inauguration Day. Section 3 of the
amendment authorized Congress to legislate a solution to that situation.
Section 3 says, “the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein
neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified,
declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is
to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President
or Vice President shall have qualified.”6 The wording here is somewhat
ambiguous, but this phrase “failure to qualify” was intended to cover both a
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1. 3 U.S.C. § 19.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
3. See Brian C. Kalt, Of Death and Deadlocks: Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment,
54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 101, 113 (2017).
4. Cf. id. at 114–17.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
6. Id. § 3.
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double death and an unresolved election—both of those would constitute
failure to qualify.
Now, the key feature of Section 3 is that it gives Congress a lot more
leeway in providing for pre-inaugural succession than the Constitution does
for the regular line of succession. First, Section 3 opens up succession to
“persons,” not just “officers.”7 This allows for a much wider range of
possible candidates, and it sidesteps entirely the constitutional questions
raised about legislative succession.
A second important source of additional leeway is that Section 3 gives
Congress two options for pre-inaugural succession. It can declare a
predetermined line of succession the way Article II allows.8 But
alternatively, Congress is empowered to provide a selection process which
would make a choice on the fly.9
The sad truth, though, is that Congress has never actually taken advantage
of the flexibility Section 3 gives it. By the time the Twentieth Amendment
was ratified in 1933, the proactive 1920s energy that animated provisions like
Section 3 and Section 4 had dissipated.10
Now, in Congress’s defense, the Great Depression represented pretty
pressing business compared to hypothetical succession issues. Then we had
World War II. But whatever the reason, the reality is that no Section 3
legislation passed between 1933 and 1947. Then, when the 1947 Act was
written, Congress just tacked Section 3 issues onto regular succession.11 It
provided the same one-size-fits-all solution for everything: Speaker of the
House, Senate president pro tempore, Cabinet.12 This was a missed
opportunity, and it’s bad policy. In my view, it’s one of the things about the
1947 Act that needs fixing.
There are multiple reasons why pre-inauguration succession should be
distinct from the middle-of-the-term succession rather than one-size-fits-all.
One reason is that in the middle of the term, the officers are typically well
settled. But, on January 20, we don’t have the new Cabinet in place yet—we
just have a bunch of acting secretaries and one designated survivor holding
over from the previous administration. As for the Speaker and president pro
tempore, if there’s some disruption with the presidential election that leaves
it still unsettled on January 20, that disruption might also extend to
congressional elections and prevent, or at least distort, the selection of the
Speaker and president pro tempore too.
There are other differences. Continuity means something very different in
the middle of the term than it does right as a new term starts. Similarly, it’s
critically important to have an immediate replacement in the middle of the
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Kalt, supra note 3, at 145.
11. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19).
12. See id.
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term, but a double death in December or early January would leave us with
more time to work things out—to have a process. On that note, we might
want different solutions for a disputed presidential election and for when a
president-elect and vice president elect both die. A disputed election would
be a very tense situation, but ideally a short-term one. We might want a
short-term caretaker with no ambition to stay in office, but at the same time,
who has the experience and gravitas needed to keep things cool during what
would assuredly be a volatile time. Contrast that to a double-death situation
where we need someone to assume the office for the entire four years, and
we just had an election and ideally should have an acting president who aligns
with a relatively clear choice that voters had made.
I have a few preliminary ideas for proposals that take stock of some of
these differences. For instance, in the election-dispute scenario, the
temporary caretakers, the ones with gravitas but not ambition: we might
draw those from a pool of former presidents, vice presidents, secretaries of
state—people who can step into the job on a moment’s notice in a way that
few others could. Although, as an aside, I think we would want to rule out
allowing the sitting president or vice president simply to remain in office for
reasons I hope are obvious.
Of course, in our current polarized partisan climate, one person’s elder
statesman is another person’s devil incarnate. That’s where Section 3’s
ability to designate a process rather than a person would come in handy. We
could ensure consensus by designating a pool of possible candidates and
requiring some sort of bipartisan agreement among congressional leaders to
sign off on a choice. Maybe they wouldn’t be able to, but we would have a
backstop, a clear default provision, and a strict time limit, but ideally have a
choice, consensus, and a process.
For a permanent replacement, I think we should have serious consideration
given to a new election. A Section 3 law could designate a caretaker while a
new national campaign is held. Alternatively, the House could choose the
new president, similar to the way it would if there were a double death in the
middle of the term and the Speaker stepped in. Here, their choice would be
purpose built, and it could be drawn from a much wider pool. At the same
time, the law could restrict the choices to members of the dead president-elect
and vice president elect’s party, or require a supermajority, again, to ensure
consensus.
All of these are only suggestions of course. The point is that Congress is
empowered by Section 3 to have a much more nuanced system for preinaugural succession than the one the 1947 Act provides. There are a lot of
good reasons for Congress to use its Section 3 power instead of completely
neglecting it, as it has for the last eighty-nine years.

